Wage Dispersion and Team Performance – An Empirical Panel Analysis
Egon Franck and Stephan Nüesch
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Wage Dispersion and Team Performance – An Empirical Panel Analysis

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(University of Zürich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics, Plattenstrasse 14, 8032 Zürich, Switzerland)

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Abstract: The impact of intra-team pay dispersion on team productivity is a highly discussed issue. On one hand, wage differentials provide incentives for higher employee effort. On the other hand, pay inequality reduces team cohesiveness and increases feelings of relative deprivation leading to lower performance. Analyzing non-linear effects of wage dispersion in professional soccer, we find empirical evidence that an initial increase of intra-team inequity reduces team performance, but at some point the relation reverses. In addition, we show that the pay structure affects the team’s playing style even after controlling for team and coach heterogeneity. We discuss the theoretical implications for the literature on optimal team compensation and illustrate managerial implications for strategic human resource management.

¹ Corresponding author: stephan.nuesch@isu.uzh.ch, phone: +41 (0)44 634 29 14, fax: +41 (0)44 634 43 48.
I INTRODUCTION

There are basically two competing hypotheses about the influence of wage dispersion on team productivity. Firstly, wage dispersion allows the creation of a positive pay-performance link, which induces higher future performance and attracts talent (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). On the other hand, large pay differentials reduce team cohesiveness (Levine 1991) and increase relative deprivation which may decrease team performance (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990). Since individuals tend to judge their own salary in relation to the income of other team-mates, the intra-team compensation structure is a highly strategic issue, particularly in teams in which workers affect the productivity of their co-workers.

The existing empirical literature on the link between wage dispersion and team performance largely concentrates on linear effects (see section III). However, given the competing hypotheses the relationship between intra-team wage differentials and team performance is unlikely to be linear (Grund and Westergaard-Nielsen, 2005). Thus, it is not very surprising that the empirical evidence of studies analyzing linear effects has not been conclusive so far. Using comprehensive panel data of professional German soccer, this paper tries to add to the existing literature not only by analyzing non-linear effects, but also by examining the impact of the team’s pay structure on the playing style. In doing so, we are able to test the theoretical predictions of Lazear (1989) who argues that a hierarchical pay structure fosters individualism and selfish behaviour, whereas a compressed wage structure encourages cooperative behaviour. Controlling for the team’s wage expenditure, roster size, team composition effects and unobserved team heterogeneity, we find evidence for a U-formed relationship between wage dispersion and sporting performance. In addition, we show that players of high-inequality soccer teams play more individualistically (i.e. have more dribblings and runs) than players of teams with a compressed wage structure. Thus, our results suggest that wage dispersion does not only affect the team’s outcome but also the way this outcome is achieved.

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2 Exceptions are Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller (1999), Brown, Sturman, and Simmering (2003), Grund and Westergaard-Nielsen (2005), which include a squared term of wage dispersion in their econometrical models.
II THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

Individuals often assess the adequacy of their rewards through a process of social comparison (Festinger 1954). Since social referents are important for anchoring judgments about pay, not only the level of an individual’s salary but also the distribution of rewards across other team members is crucial. The influence of wage dispersion on productivity is controversial as the following two hypotheses indicate.

Under the hierarchical pay hypothesis, the intra-team wage structure is considered as an incentive system that attracts talent and stimulates individual effort. In order to keep highly talented star players, it is often inevitable to introduce significant wage differentials (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). In addition, wage dispersion allows creating a meritocracy in which rewards are expected to increase with worker performance (Bloom 1999). Such a positive pay-performance link increases the returns for higher performance and thereby induces higher future performance (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992).

Ramaswamy and Rowthorn (1991) offer a second argument in favour of high pay dispersion. They argue that differentiated labour introduces different levels of “damage potential” for the efficient firm (team) production. Workers with greater damage potential should be paid higher wages in order to mitigate their motivation to inflict damage on the team’s productivity. Workers who are less prone to disruption are paid less. The model of Ramaswamy and Rowthorne (1991) implies that wage dispersion should have a positive impact on team productivity.

The wage compression hypothesis, however, predicts that team performance reacts negatively to wage dispersion increases. Levine (1991) argues that an egalitarian pay structure sustains and stimulates cohesiveness which enhances the team’s total productivity given a participatory team. Similar arguments are advanced by Martin (1981) who conjectures that workers tend to experience feelings of relative deprivation if wages are unequal. The notion “relative deprivation” goes back to Stouffer and his colleagues (1949) who found out that in the military police, where the promotions were infrequent, job satisfaction was greater than in the air corps, where most survivors could anticipate rapid promotions. The level of social discontent is largely determined by the relative comparison of one’s own social and economic conditions with the perceived conditions enjoyed by some specific reference group, in teams typically other teammates. Akerlof and Yellen (1990) explain that deprived workers are not only less
satisfied but tend to withdraw effort as well. Field evidence of the behavioral consequences of relative deprivation, however, is scarce. Drago and Garvey (1998) analyzed helping effort in workgroups based on questionnaires distributed among Australian companies. They find that cooperation is reduced when promotion incentives are large. Mas (2006) shows that police performance is negatively affected by the gaps between the actual wage and the requested wage in arbitration. After winning arbitration, arrest rates are 12 percent higher than when arbitration is lost.

A complementary theory promoting wage compression has been offered by Milgrom (1988) and Milgrom and Roberts (1990). They argue that workers are more likely to engage in costly rent-seeking instead of productive work if high wage differentials create much potential for redistribution at the discretion of the supervisor.

As the following model shows, the overall impact of wage dispersion on team productivity is very unlikely to be linear: Let team performance (TP) be a function of the team’s wage dispersion (x) measured by the intra-team Gini coefficient (thus 0 < x < 1). The hierarchical pay hypothesis can be formalized as $TP_{hp}(x) = ax'$, where $a > 0$ and $r > 0$ indicate the magnitude and slope of the positive impact of wage inequality on productivity. The wage compression hypothesis, however, predicts that wage dispersion decreases team performance. We denote this negative relationship as $TP_{wc}(x) = -bx'$, where both $b$ and $t$ are positive. The overall effect of wage dispersion on team performance can be characterized as the sum of the two components including a positive intercept $\alpha$:

$$TP(x) = \alpha + TP_{hp}(x) - TP_{wc}(x) = \alpha + ax' - bx'. \quad (1)$$

The shape of this function depends on the particular values of the parameters $a$, $b$, $r$ and $t$. It is U-shaped for $r > t$ with a local minimum at $(bt/ar)^{(r-t)}$ and inversely U-formed for $r < t$ with a local maximum at $(ar/bt)^{(r-t)}$. If $r = t$, the effect of wage dispersion on team performance is strictly positive for $a > b$ and strictly negative if the opposite is true (see Figure 1). The relationship between team performance and wage dispersion is non-linear unless $r = t = 1$.

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3 The following model builds on the model proposed by Grund and Westergaard-Nielsen (2005).
Since theory does not provide arguments in favour of only one of the illustrations, the nature of the relationship between wage dispersion and team performance remains an empirical question. But before explaining the empirical procedure of the present study, we want to give a short overview on the existing (empirical) literature.

### III PREVIOUS RESULTS

Given the fact that most empirical studies examine linear effects it is not surprising that the results vary considerably. In the following we start with the clear minority of papers that allow for potential non-linearity either by including a squared term of wage dispersion or by computing interaction effects.
Using panel data of Austrian firms covering the period 1975-1991, Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller (1999) find a humped-shaped relationship between intra-firm wage dispersion and firm productivity. Since the authors did not have data on the financial performance of the firms, they constructed two standardized earnings indicators as dependent variables. Bingley and Eriksson (2001) also find an inversely U-shaped relationship between the pay spread and skewness and total factor productivity of Danish firms. However, this effect applies only to white collar workers. Using another linked employer-employee data set of Danish firms, Grund and Westergaard-Nielsen (2005) test non-linear effects of the dispersion regarding both wage levels and wage increases. Whereas the first did not significantly affect the value added per employee, wage increase dispersion clearly impacts on the firm’s performance, namely in a U-shaped way. Brown et al. (2003) analyze efficiency, operational, and financial implications of pay dispersion in the US health care industry. Allowing for non-linear effects, their study shows that high wage dispersion enhances the average length of stay, which indicates a decrease in resource efficiency. The coefficient of the non-linear term of pay inequality though is low and only weakly significant.

Three other studies use moderators to account for potential non-linearity due to different situational contingencies. Shaw, Gupta and Delery (2002) show that wage dispersion will be associated with higher levels of workforce performance if accompanied by formal individual incentive systems and independent work. Conversely, dispersion is likely to be ineffective in the context of high work interdependence. Their finding is based on survey research studies in two industrial sectors (the motor carrier and concrete pipe industries). Beaumont and Harris (2003) examine the relationship between the internal wage structure and firm productivity using UK manufacturing micro-data in five industrial sectors. Whereas the wage compression hypothesis holds in the pharmaceutical sector, it does not hold in the sectors of electronic data processing, motor vehicles and engines, aerospace, or miscellaneous foods. They additionally find that plant size and ownership differences moderate the influence of wage dispersion on productivity: While a compressed wage structure increases firm performance in small domestic firms, it has a negative productivity effect regarding large, foreign-owned plants. Jirjahn and Kraft (2007) use data on a sample of manufacturing establishments in Germany to analyze the interaction effects of wage dispersion and the industrial relations regime as well as of wage dispersion and the incentive scheme employed. Their estimates show that compared to
the benchmark, wage dispersion exerts a substantially higher positive impact on productivity if the establishment pays piece rates and does neither have a works council nor a collective agreement.

A first strand of the broad literature examining linear effects provides evidence in favour of the “wage compression hypothesis”. Cowherd and Levine (1992) analyzed the relationship between interclass pay equity and the performance of business units. Building on equity and relative deprivation theory, they argue that wage compression is positively related to business-unit product quality. They take product quality as performance measure because it is difficult for managers to control and is, therefore, highly sensitive to motivational factors. Their empirical findings based on data collected from North American and European business units show that interclass pay equity significantly increases product quality. Pfeffer and Langton (1993) investigated how wage dispersion affects the individual’s satisfaction, research performance and cooperation within academic departments. Using a large sample of college and university professors from 600 academic departments, they find that the greater the degree of wage dispersion the lower is the individual member’s satisfaction and research productivity and the less likely it is that faculty members will collaborate on research.

Another strand of the empirical literature finds support for the “hierarchical pay hypothesis”. Analyzing top executive pay structures in US corporations, Main, O’Reilly, and Wade (1993) find evidence that there is a statistically significant association between a firm’s performance, as measured by both stock market return and return on assets, and the coefficient of variation of the top executive team’s salaries. Eriksson (1999) confirms that higher wage dispersion is related to better firm performance using longitudinal data from Danish firms. Lallemand, Plasman, and Ryx (2004) support this finding for Belgian firms and Heyman (2005) for Swedish corporations.

Yet, other studies find no relationship between the wage structure and firm performance. Leonard (1990) analyzed the link between the executive compensation policy and the financial performance of large US corporations. His study shows that the intra-firm variance in managerial pay has no significant impact on the corporation’s performance. Hibbs and Locking (2000) examined the influence of wage dispersion within plants and industries on performance in Sweden. Running a Cobb-Douglas
production function specification including measures of wage dispersion, they did not find a significant relationship between pay inequality and performance.

A substantial number of the empirical studies analyzing the impact of wage dispersion on team performance have been conducted in the field of professional team sports with a clear dominance of the US Major leagues, in particular of Major League Baseball (MLB). Richard and Guell (1998) find that the variance of the team’s salary reduces the winning percentage of teams in MLB controlling for lagged winning percentage and total payroll. Depken (2000) replicates this finding using a team fixed-effects model. The results of Bloom (1999) indicate that pay dispersion does not only reduce group performance, but also the individual performance of baseball players. Jewell and Molina (2004) place the discussion of MLB payroll inequality and team success in a stochastic production frontier framework, and DeBrock, Hendricks and Koenker (2004) additionally analyze the impact of estimated salary differentials due to different levels of individual lagged performance, experience and other player specific controls. Both studies also find a negative relationship between the intra-team wage dispersion and team performance in MLB. Sommers (1998) discovers a (weakly significant) negative impact of the team’s Gini coefficient on the points achieved in the National Hockey League (NHL) holding the team’s wage expenditures constant, while Gomez (2002) finds no effect of salary inequality on the winning percentage in the NHL estimating a fixed-effects model. Using data from all four major North American sports leagues (i.e. baseball, basketball, football, and hockey) Frick, Prinz and Winkelmann (2003) show that a higher degree of pay inequality enhances the performance of basketball and hockey teams but decreases the winning percentage of football and baseball teams. Berri and Jewell (2004), however, do not find a significant correlation between wage dispersion and team productivity in the NBA.

As this literature review indicates, we are – to the best of our knowledge – the first to examine non-linear effects of wage dispersion in professional sports. Moreover, we are the first to investigate the impact of pay inequality on the team’s playing style using precise field performance measures like the number of passes, crosses, dribblings or runs.
IV EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK

Our empirical analysis is based on panel data of all teams appearing in the first German soccer league during twelve seasons (from 1995/96 until 2006/07). Professional sports offer some important advantages for empirical studies of organizational and personnel issues (Kahn, 2000): First, in most sports a large panel data set is available due to the frequency and regularity of athletic events. Second, performance is clearly observable and measured with great accuracy. Third, hypotheses may be tested in relatively controlled field environments. The athletes face the same rules and restrictions. Thus, when analyzing the connection between wage dispersion and team performance, a lot of other influencing factors can be controlled for (Wolfe et al., 2005). However, the same properties which make the sports context an advantageous area of research – published salaries, clear performance measures, controlled environment – also limit the generalizability of sport studies (Harder, 1992).

DEPENDENT AND EXPLANATORY VARIABLES

Soccer success is measured by the *winning percentage* and the *league standing* at the end of the season. The *winning percentage* variable is calculated by dividing the achieved points at the end of the season through the maximum possible points. The second dependent variable *league standing* is given by the formula:

\[ -\ln\left(\frac{\text{position}}{n + 1 - \text{position}}\right) \]

whereas \( n \) denotes the number of clubs in the league (in our case 18). Thus, the *league standing* variable varies between +2.89 (club winning the championship) and -2.89 (least successful club).

We used two alternative measures of pay dispersion as explanatory variables. The first, the Gini coefficient, is a common metric employed in economic research to measure the degree of inequality in income distributions. As a second alternative measure, we use the coefficient of variation.\(^4\) The Gini index and the coefficient of variation are computed for each team and each season separately using 5316 individual salary proxies provided by the *Kicker Sportmagazin*, the most prominent soccer

\(^4\) Allison (1978) discusses several measures of inequality and finds that both the Gini index and the coefficient of variation are advantageous in many respects. Harrison and Klein (2007) also recommend the same two measures to capture the effects of pay disparity. We did not use the Herfindahl index as measure of a team’s wage dispersion because the potential range of the Herfindahl index is affected by the team’s roster size.
magazine in Germany. Since the salary proxies are estimated in a systematic manner for several years by almost the same editorial staff, they are likely to be consistent (Torgler and Schmidt, 2007), especially when using the Gini coefficient for which only relative proportions matter. In order to explore the reliability of our data, we compared it with the market value estimates provided by a second independent source regarding the season 2005/06, namely the team independent institution Online-Pro that runs the webpage www.transfermarkt.de. The two estimations are strongly correlated (correlation is 0.89). Estimated at the beginning of each season our salary proxies do not incorporate current performance bonuses, which weakens potential simultaneity between wage dispersion and team performance. The issue of simultaneity matters whenever it is plausible that successful teams pay higher performance bonuses, which in turn leads to more wage inequality. To capture the predicted non-linearity, we also include the squared values of the Gini index and the coefficient of variation.

Following Depken (2000) we use the logarithm of wage expenditures as control variable for the team’s playing talent. Forrest and Simmons (2002) show that in European soccer high wage expenditures clearly increase field success. Thus, we use the logarithm of wage expenditures as control variable for the team’s playing talent. In order to account for team composition effects which are likely to affect both wage dispersion and team productivity we include a proxy for intra-team talent heterogeneity in our model. This variable is determined by the standard deviations of the average match evaluations the players receive within a given season. In German soccer every match performance of a player who plays more than half an hour is individually and consistently evaluated and marked by sports experts. These evaluations are published in the Kicker soccer magazine and have the advantage of being less influenced by the tactical position of a player than e.g. goals or assists. In addition, we control for the roster size and use seasonal dummies to account for time-effects.

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5 However, this does not contradict our hierarchical pay hypothesis. Even players, whose market values are at the low end of the distribution at a given season, may be motivated by greater pay dispersion to display better field performances in order to receive a higher base salary next season.
6 Bingley and Eriksson (2001), Lallemand et al. (2004) or Heyman (2005) address the issue of simultaneity by using income tax information excluding bonuses or lagged predetermined values of wage dispersion as instruments of the current pay inequality.
7 Wage expenditures are expressed in 2003 Euro and adjusted for inflation.
Table 1: Variables and Descriptive Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winning percentage</td>
<td>Ratio of achieved points divided by the maximum possible points at the end of the season</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>League standing</td>
<td>Modified league standing at the end of the season (-ln(rank/(n+1(rank)))</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Explanatory Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage Dispersion Variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini</td>
<td>Gini coefficient of the wage distribution at the beginning of the season</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini square</td>
<td>Square of the Gini coefficient</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CV</td>
<td>Coefficient of variation of the wage distribution at the beginning of the season</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CV square</td>
<td>Square of the coefficient of variation</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talent heterogeneity</td>
<td>Standard deviation of the average individual match evaluations within a team and season</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log wage expenditures</td>
<td>Logarithm of the wage expenditures in terms of Euro 2003 at the beginning of the season</td>
<td>17.23</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roster size</td>
<td>Number of players within a team</td>
<td>24.83</td>
<td>3.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The model also includes season dummies that are not reported.

**ESTIMATION APPROACH**

It is well known that panel data requires special econometric modeling, either pooled regression, random or fixed-effects modeling. An F test following a fixed-effects regression indicates that there are significant team-level effects (F-statistics are between 2.46 and 2.81) implying that pooled OLS would be inappropriate. In order to decide whether the team-level effects are random or fixed, we performed the Hausman specification test (Hausman, 1978), which compares the fixed-effects model with the random-effects model. Whereas the fixed-effects model allows the team-level effects to be correlated with the regressors, the random-effects model assumes strict orthogonality. The Hausman test clearly rejects this assumption in all cases at the 1% significance level (chi-square statistics between 48 and 95), which suggests that team-level effects are inadequately modeled by a random-effects model. An additional aspect supporting the use of a fixed-effects approach lies in the nature of our data set. Due to promotion and relegation in European soccer, we have an unbalanced panel as some teams do not always play in the first German soccer league. The reason why a team gets promoted or relegated (called attrition) is not random. Instead, it is likely to be correlated with unobserved team playing strength, which may cause biased estimators due to resulting sample selection. Through our choice of a fixed-effects model, this
problem is moderated because fixed-effects analysis allows for the attrition to be correlated with the constant unobserved effect (Wooldridge, 2003).

The fixed-effects approach consistently estimates partial effects in the presence of time-constant omitted variables as long as the explanatory variables are strictly exogenous (Wooldridge, 2002). A test of strict exogeneity checks whether the regressors are uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic error at any point of time. Following Wooldridge (2002, p. 285), we specify the following regression equation:

\[ y_{it} = x_{it}' \beta + w_{it}' \delta + v_{it} + c_i + \epsilon_{ia}, \]

where \( x_{it}' \) is the vector of explanatory variables, \( w_{it}' \) denotes a subset of \( x_{it}' \) for club \( i \) in the subsequent year \( t+1 \), \( v_{it} \) is the time effect, \( c_i \) the unobserved team effect and \( \epsilon_{ia} \) the remaining error term. A test of the null hypothesis of strict exogeneity is equivalent to testing \( H_0 : \delta = 0 \). First, we have to choose the relevant elements of \( w_{it}' \). Here, it is crucial to consider for which regressors future values might be correlated with \( \epsilon_{ia} \). As it seems plausible that a shock in the current dependent variable may affect all our explanatory variables, we include future values of all our regressors. Based on the specification in equation (2), we clearly reject the null hypothesis regarding future wage expenditures. However, we did not find that a shock in the current dependent variable significantly influences the team’s wage dispersion, talent heterogeneity or roster size in the next season.

The results of the Wooldridge test of strict exogeneity reveal that current sporting success increases the team’s future budgets. In European soccer some financial rewards are largely determined by relative field performance. Successful clubs do not only receive a higher share of the broadcasting revenues, they are also more likely to qualify for the very lucrative UEFA Champions League that provides significant extra-money in the following season.

The use of instrumental variables is a common approach to the endogeneity problem. We consider the league standing and the home attendance in the precedent

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8 See e.g. Kyriazidou (1997) for a procedure to also account for non-constant selection effects.
9 Detailed regression results are available form the authors upon request.
10 In the season 2004/05 the qualified clubs received in total € 414.1 million of broadcasting income and generated substantial extra match day turnover.
season as a good instrument of the current wage expenditures.\textsuperscript{11} The following reduced form of the first-stage equation,

\[ \log \text{wage expenditures}_t = -1.00 + 0.15 \log \text{league standing}_{t-1} + 0.33 \log \text{home attendance}_{t-1}, \]

\[ (0.76) \quad (0.02) \quad (0.06) \]

shows that the chosen instruments are highly correlated with the endogenous variable. As suggested by Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995), we report the F-statistic for joint significance of the instruments in the first-stage equation as a diagnostic in Table 2.\textsuperscript{12} The second requirement for adequate instruments, namely that instrumental variables must not be correlated with the equation’s disturbance process, is tested by the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions. The null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term is not rejected in all model specifications. The Breusch-Pagan test does not signal any problem of heteroskedasticity.

We find evidence that sportive success reacts in a U-formed way to intra-team wage dispersion (see Table 2). Since the turning point is close to the mean of the Gini index and the coefficient of variation, both the declining and the rising part are relevant in our sample. Hence, our results imply that teams do better by either deciding for a steep hierarchical pay structure or for a rather egalitarian one. However, to be “stuck in the middle” is detrimental for sporting success. Since we control for the talent heterogeneity within a team, the impact is not driven by pure team composition effects. The significant negative coefficient of the roster size indicates that teams with a smaller squad outperform large teams, holding wage expenditures and the other explanatory variables constant.

\textsuperscript{11} We use gate attendance instead of gate revenue as instrument because revenue data is partly not available for precedent seasons.

\textsuperscript{12} Since we do not have multiple endogenous variables, we do not need to report the Shea partial $R^2$ measure that takes the intercorrelations among the instruments into account (see Shea, 1997).
Table 2: Test of the Effect of Wage Dispersion on Team Performance Using a 2SLS Team Fixed-Effects Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Winning Percentage</th>
<th>League Standing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1) (2)</td>
<td>(3) (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini</td>
<td>-1.268 *</td>
<td>-21.417 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.866)</td>
<td>(8.140)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini square</td>
<td>1.465 *</td>
<td>25.866 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.883)</td>
<td>(10.784)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CV</td>
<td>-0.651 ***</td>
<td>-9.857 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.269)</td>
<td>(3.291)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CV square</td>
<td>0.399 ***</td>
<td>6.246 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.184)</td>
<td>(2.252)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team heterogeneity</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>0.579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.079)</td>
<td>(0.962)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log wage expenditures</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>0.466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.079)</td>
<td>(0.962)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roster size</td>
<td>-0.008 **</td>
<td>-0.103 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Season dummies</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R² within</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of observations</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Diagnostics**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joint-significance of instruments in first-stage regression (F-statistics)</td>
<td>52.330 *** 52.900 *** 52.330 *** 52.900 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sargan statistic (Chi-square)</td>
<td>0.721 0.641 0.705 0.656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breusch-Pagan (p-value)</td>
<td>0.706 0.718 0.957 0.949</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** 2SLS estimation with team fixed effects. Log wage expenditures \( \phi \) is instrumented by league standing \( z_{ij} \) and log home attendance \( \rho_{ij} \). Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels (two-tailed): * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.

Following Lazear (1989) wage dispersion does not only affect the final team output but also the way this output is produced. Particularly, he predicts that members of high inequality teams behave less cooperatively and act more selfishly than members of teams with a compressed wage structure. Having detailed information about various field performance measures like passes, crosses, dribbles and runs for a sub sample of seasons, we are able to test the postulated hypothesis. We consider the number of passes and crosses – defined as all sideways passes from the sidelines in the opposition half – as playing elements reflecting cooperation and interactivity within a team. As indicators of individualistic or even selfish behaviour, we use the numbers of dribbles and runs. Even though a certain level of both individualistic and interactive plays is necessary to win a game, there are still a lot of situations in which “selfish” plays like dribblings may be replaced by “cooperative” plays like passing the ball – or the other way round. In the following, we test the influence of the intra-team Gini coefficient and the coefficient of variation on both “cooperative” and “individualistic” plays, controlling for (unobserved)
team heterogeneity, wage expenditures or roster size. Since accurate information of coach instructions is not available, we try to control for coach specific effects including coach dummies. As the results in Table 3 show, coaches truly exert high influence on the team’s playing style. But even after holding coach heterogeneity constant we find that the team’s wage dispersion significantly increases the number of seasonal dribblings and runs. The hypothesis that teams with a rather egalitarian pay structure play more cooperatively, however, is not supported.

Table 3: Team Fixed-Effects Estimation Results of the Playing Style

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Cooperative Plays</th>
<th>Individualistic Plays</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Passes</td>
<td>Crosses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini</td>
<td>260.4</td>
<td>-86.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2180.2)</td>
<td>(215.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CV</td>
<td>-81.6</td>
<td>-78.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1224.6)</td>
<td>(123.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log wage expenditure</td>
<td>666.6</td>
<td>95.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1085.0)</td>
<td>(73.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roster size</td>
<td>-43.6</td>
<td>-6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(61.4)</td>
<td>(6.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coach Fixed Effects</td>
<td>yes ***</td>
<td>yes ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>yes ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>yes ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>yes ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R² within</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of observations</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Robust standard errors clustered on teams in parantheses. Significance levels (one-tailed): * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.

V CONCLUSION

Given the competing hypotheses about the relationship between wage dispersion and team productivity, empirical models have to allow for potential non-linearity. Using salary and performance data of all soccer teams appearing in the first German soccer league, we find evidence for a U-formed relationship between the intra-team wage dispersion and sporting success. Teams that have either an egalitarian or a very differential pay structure are more successful on the field than teams with a medium level of wage dispersion, holding a team’s talent heterogeneity constant. Considering the remuneration system as one important element of team culture, our results suggest that soccer teams should either have a strong culture of individualism and personal rewards or a culture of cooperation, teamwork and team based rewards. We find clear

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13 Team level effects are jointly significant in most of the models, implying that a pooled regression is not suitable. The Hausman specification test reveals that the team level effects correlate with the regressors, implying that the fixed-effects approach is appropriate.

14 Here we do not find evidence for potential non-linearity.
evidence that the pay structure affects the team’s playing style since teams with a hierarchical pay structure have significantly more runs and dribblings than teams with more compressed wages.

The empirical finding that an increase of pay inequality reduces performance only in rather egalitarian teams and even here with diminishing marginal effects is consistent with newer articles about the relationship between inequality and relative deprivation. While the traditional concept of Yitzhaki (1979), Hey and Lambert (1980) and others assumed that relative deprivation increases proportionally with the Gini coefficient, more recent approaches (Paul, 1991; Podder, 1996; Paul, 1999) abandon the idea of a linear relationship. They rather argue that relative deprivation reacts less than proportionally to the Gini, because individuals usually tend to compare themselves only with nearby referents. Runciman (1972, p. 285) writes: “Most people’s lives are governed more by the resentment of narrow inequalities, the cultivation of modest ambitions and the preservation of small differentials (...”). Paul (1991) argues that people care much more about income changes of people who are near to them in the income scale than of those who are very far off from them. Thus, an income transfer from a peer who earns slightly more to an already highly earning “superstar” may even decrease the feelings of relative deprivation despite increasing the team’s Gini coefficient. The relevance of fairness considerations declines as inequality increases.

Since remuneration and status are usually highly correlated, our result that increasing wage dispersion above a certain level again enhances team performance also contributes to the literature on status hierarchies and team effectiveness. Overbeck, Correll, and Park (2005) show that teams having clear status hierarchies are more effective than teams with a lot of high status seeking individuals. Groysberg, Polzer, and Elfenbein (2007) agree that “too many cooks spoil the broth”. Studying the group effectiveness of Wall Street equity research analysts, they find that the marginal benefit of stars diminishes as the proportion of star analysts in a research group increases. It becomes even negative when the star proportion within a team exceeds a certain threshold level. The authors argue that clear social hierarchies reduce dysfunctional team processes by bringing clarity to social interactions and increasing team effectiveness. As the findings of this paper indicate, this applies to pay hierarchies as well, at least regarding high inequality teams.

Of course, the professional sports context is in some ways unique: Individual performance during the games is readily observed by thousands of spectators. The
salaries are much higher, on average, than in most other occupations and professional sports is a typical context of pay for performance (Harder, 1992). These particularities limit the generalizability of the study. The results might be different in situations in which performance is less visible, for example regarding organizational citizenship behaviour (Organ, 1988). Nevertheless, the results of this paper have important managerial implications for strategic human resource management and for compensation strategies in particular. Since the compensation structure does not only affect the overall team effectiveness but also team collaboration and interaction, it should carefully be aligned with the team strategy. Instead of imposing one common compensation system on all work teams, members of teams attaching high importance to collaboration and social interaction should have similar wages in order to prevent relative deprivation and the associated reduction of helping behaviour. Other teams, however, focusing on extraordinary individual performances are better off allowing for high earning differentials in order to maximize team productivity.

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